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INTRODUCTION 
The common law of conduct-based, foreign official immunity in the 
United States is in a state of flux. In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
finding in Samantar v. Yousuf that individual foreign official immunity is 
no longer governed by the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA), but 
rather by common law,1 the federal circuit courts of appeals have diverged 
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 1.  See generally Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 308 (2010). Justice Stevens wrote the 
majority opinion in Samantar, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, 
Alito and Sotomayor joined. Justices Alito, Thomas, and Scalia wrote concurring opinions. Id. at 306. 
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on two pivotal issues related to conduct-based, foreign official immunity. 
The first is how much deference, or “weight,” to give an executive branch 
suggestion of immunity (SOI). The second is whether to recognize a jus 
cogens exception to this conduct-based immunity.2 This Article analyzes 
the implications of these two key splits—not only for outcomes, but for 
fairness, consistency, deterrence, and impunity. It also addresses strategies 
putative plaintiffs may wish to adopt to “pierce the veil” of immunity. 
These strategies are based on jurisprudence related to the “splits” and on 
other post-Samantar cases addressing both conduct-based, foreign official 
and status-based, head of state immunity. 
The uncertainty surrounding conduct-based, foreign official immunity 
may mean that defendants will experience disparate outcomes in similar 
cases, creating deterrence-related challenges and perceived unfairness. This 
uncertainty also makes it less likely that litigants will be able to predict 
 
For an explanation of the differences between the conduct-based and status-based varieties, or “types,” 
of foreign official immunity, see Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the 
U.S. Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 234–35 (2011) 
([“…Customary International Law] has long distinguished between immunity based on the status of a 
government official and immunity based on the subject matter of an official's conduct. With respect to 
the first type of immunity, referred to as “status immunity” or “immunity ratione personae,” certain 
officials such as diplomats and “heads of state” (a category that includes presidents, prime ministers, 
monarchs, and foreign ministers) are immune from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of other nations' 
courts. Status immunity is substantively broad; it applies to all claims against the official, regardless of 
whether they concern public or private acts or whether the acts took place during the official's time in 
office. But status immunity is also temporary; it ends when the official leaves office. The second type of 
immunity is “conduct immunity” or “immunity ratione materiae.” Unlike status immunity, conduct 
immunity “covers only official acts, that is, conduct adopted by a State official in the discharge of his or 
her functions.” Inasmuch as conduct immunity is based on the individual's actions and not his personal 
status, it extends to all government officials who carry out state functions. For the same reason, conduct 
immunity does not depend on whether the official is currently in office and thus applies equally to 
former officials.” Id. at 234-35 (quoting Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal 
Jurisdiction: Memorandum Prepared by the Secretariat, International Law Commission, 60th Sess (Mar 
31, 2008), UN Doc A/CN.4/596 36 at ¶ 148)(other internal citations omitted). For the rationales 
underlying these two types of foreign official immunities, see id. 
 2.  See infra Part II for a detailed description of the two “splits.” For an explanation of a jus 
cogens norm, see Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the U.S. Common 
Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 236–37 (2011)(“[A] growing number of 
domestic and international judicial decisions have considered whether a foreign official acts as an arm 
of the state, and thus is entitled to conduct immunity, when that official allegedly violates a jus cogens 
norm of international law or commits an international crime. A jus cogens norm is a rule of 
international law that has been “accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” Norms commonly said to 
qualify as jus cogens include the prohibitions on genocide, slavery, and torture. International crimes 
include genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.”) Id. at 236–37 (quoting Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art 53, 1155 UN Treaty Ser 332, 8 Intl Leg Mat 679 (1969)(other 
internal citations omitted). For purposes of this Article, all of these norms, prohibitions, and crimes fall 
under the rubric, or category, of “jus cogens.” 
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immunity outcomes in individual cases, muddling their decision-making 
calculus and creating associated inefficiencies.3 
Moreover, the aforementioned divergence, or “split,” may be 
connected to the status of foreign precedent and customary international 
law with regard to conduct-based immunity. For example, the split in the 
federal circuit courts on whether a jus cogens exception to conduct-based 
immunity exists for foreign officials may itself reflect uncertainty in 
customary international law and foreign national precedent on this issue (at 
least in the civil context).4 But although this law and these precedents can 
inform judicial decision-making on the issue in the United States,5 both the 
ultimate resolution of the split and the particular direction U.S. 
jurisprudence will take on this issue, awaits a future decision by the U.S. 
Supreme Court or, perhaps, congressional intervention through targeted 
legislation. Evolving U.S. jurisprudence on this issue may, in turn, 
contribute to the development of customary international law. 
However, in the wake of Samantar, there is uniform agreement among 
the lower courts in the United States that executive branch guidance in the 
context of status-based, head of state immunity is determinative, though 
certain limited exceptions to this immunity have been recognized.6 In 
addition, the jurisprudence following Samantar suggests several possible 
strategies for plaintiffs suing heads of state and foreign officials claiming 
immunity for alleged human rights and other abuses, including exerting 
certain pressures on the executive branch and obtaining a waiver from the 
foreign state.7 Plaintiffs suing foreign officials may also wish to consider 
certain strategies related to “forum-shopping,” framing their allegations, 
and selecting a case theory.8 Though these tactics do not ensure that courts 
will pierce the immunity veil, and may not be available in all cases, the 
strategies at least offer plaintiffs possible avenues for overcoming 
immunity. 
Part I explains the landmark Samantar v. Yousuf case in detail. Part II 
then describes the aforementioned circuit splits. Part III canvases key post-
 
 3.  Some litigants may believe—incorrectly—that they can succeed at trial and forego settlement. 
Others may not want to risk losing at trial and settle cases they could perhaps have won, thereby 
stymieing jurisprudential development. 
 4.  See infra note 120 and accompanying text.  
 5.  Id. 
 6.  See infra notes 102–112 and accompanying text. 
 7.  See infra notes 60, 77, 118, and 127. 
 8.  See infra notes 135–139 and accompanying text for a discussion of the strategies related to 
forum shopping and framing allegations and case theory. For a discussion of waiver, see infra notes 127 
and 132 and accompanying text. For the general idea of exerting pressure on the executive branch to 
influence its guidance on the immunity question, see infra notes 118 and 132 and accompanying text. 
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Samantar decisions issued by U.S. district courts both on conduct-based, 
foreign official immunity and on status-based, head of state immunity. The 
cases selected for inclusion in Part III illustrate strategies plaintiffs may 
wish to adopt to overcome these immunities. Part IV analyzes the 
implications of the two circuit splits described in Part II regarding the 
appropriate level of judicial deference to afford executive SOIs in the 
conduct-based, foreign official immunity context, and on whether this 
immunity should be granted to officials in cases of alleged jus cogens 
violations. Part IV also examines status-based, head of state immunity 
issues in the wake of Samantar, including deference to executive SOIs in 
this context and possible immunity exceptions. Finally, Part IV explores 
certain strategic considerations for plaintiffs suing foreign officials for 
human rights abuses in U.S. courts. 
I. SAMANTAR V. YOUSUF 
In Samantar v. Yousuf, plaintiffs-respondents were several Somalis 
who sought damages under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) and 
Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for torture and extrajudicial killings allegedly 
authorized by defendant-petitioner Samantar.9 At the time of the alleged 
acts, Samantar was the First Vice-President and Minister of Defense of 
Somalia and had served as the Prime Minister during the 1980s.10 
However, in 1991, Samantar fled Somalia for the United States. The United 
States declined to recognize any official government of Somalia following 
the collapse of the military regime in that country in the early 1990s.11 
The federal district court in Samantar found that it lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims because Samantar was entitled to 
official immunity under the FSIA.12 The court also found that the FSIA 
applied to individual officials acting on behalf of the state in their official 
capacity.13 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, reversed. 
It held, citing the statute’s text and structure, that the FSIA did not apply to 
individual officials.14 
 
 9.  Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 308 (2010) (“Respondents are members of the Isaaq clan, 
which included well-educated and prosperous Somalis who were subjected to systematic persecution 
during the 1980’s by the military regime then governing Somalia. They allege that petitioner exercised 
command and control over members of the Somali military forces who tortured, killed, or arbitrarily 
detained them or members of their families; that petitioner knew or should have known of the abuses 
perpetrated by his subordinates; and that he aided and abetted the commission of these abuses.”). 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id. at 308–09.  
 12.  Id. at 309. 
 13.  Id.  
 14.  See id. at 310. 
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The Supreme Court began its analysis in Samantar by tracing the 
history of foreign sovereign immunity in the United States, noting that it 
had developed under the common law in the landmark case of Schooner 
Exchange v. McFaddon: 
 
The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity developed as a matter of 
common law long before the FSIA was enacted in 1976. In 
Verlinden . . ., we explained that in Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon . . . 
, “Chief Justice Marshall concluded that . . . the United States had 
impliedly waived jurisdiction over certain activities of foreign 
sovereigns.” The Court’s specific holding in Schooner Exchange was 
that a federal court lacked jurisdiction over “a national armed vessel . . . 
of the emperor of France,” . . . but the opinion was interpreted as 
extending virtually absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns as “a matter 
of grace and comity[.]”15 
 
According to the Court in Samantar, a two-pronged procedure developed at 
common law for deciding questions of foreign sovereign immunity, 
including questions of foreign official immunity, following Schooner 
Exchange. First, a foreign state’s representative requests an SOI for itself or 
its official from the United States Department of State. Then, if the request 
is granted, the district court declines to exercise its jurisdiction over the 
sovereign or official.16 In addition, the Court noted that although the State 
Department had previously sought “immunity in all actions against friendly 
sovereigns,”17 it began to follow an immunity approach known as the 
restrictive approach, or “theory,” of immunity in 1952. 
Under the restrictive theory—laid down in the now-famous Tate 
Letter18—foreign states have immunity for official, public acts but do not 
enjoy immunity for commercial acts.19 Unfortunately, the State Department 
did not always follow its own guidance as a result of political pressure, and, 
at times, recommended the immunity of a foreign state even though it had 
 
 15.  Id. at 311 (third and fourth ellipses in original) (quoting Verlinden B. V. v. Cent. Bank of 
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (citing Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 146 (1812))). 
 16.  Id. at 311–12. If the State Department did not issue an SOI, the district court decided the 
immunity question itself. In so doing, the “district court inquired ‘whether the ground of immunity is 
one which it is the established policy of the [State Department] to recognize.’” Id. at 312 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 36 (1945)). 
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Id. (citing Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486–87); see Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal 
Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 
Dept. State Bull. 984–85 (1952). 
 19.  See id. (citing Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487). States engage in commercial acts when they 
perform acts in a way that is similar to a corporation engaged in business-related activities (e.g., 
purchasing and selling goods for profit, etc.).  
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engaged in commercial activity.20 Due to the inconsistencies in State 
Department SOIs under the Tate Letter, Congress codified the common law 
restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity in 1976 by passing the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”).21 In so doing, Congress 
shifted the task of determining immunity from the State Department to the 
courts.22 
In light of this history, the Court in Samantar initially framed the issue 
and holding as follows: 
 
[W]hether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA or 
Act) . . . provides petitioner [Samantar] with immunity from suit based 
on actions taken in his official capacity. We hold that the FSIA does not 
govern the determination of petitioner’s immunity from suit.23 
 
And later in its opinion, the Court commented: 
 
Our review of the text, purpose, and history of the FSIA leads us to the 
conclusion that the Court of Appeals correctly held the FSIA does not 
govern petitioner’s claim of immunity. The Act therefore did not deprive 
the District Court of subject-matter jurisdiction.24 
 
In holding that the FSIA did not apply to individual foreign officials, 
the Court looked to the text of the FSIA. The Court focused, in particular, 
on the fact that individuals sued for conduct undertaken in their official 
capacities are not “foreign states” subject to immunity under the FSIA. The 
FSIA’s definition of foreign state includes its political subdivisions, 
agencies, and instrumentalities.25 The Court held that this phasing does not 
encompass foreign officials because, 
 
Congress has specifically defined “agency or instrumentality” in the 
FSIA, and all of the textual clues in that definition cut against such a 
broad construction. . . . [T]he statute specifies that “‘agency or 
instrumentality . . .’ means any entity” matching three [particular] 
 
 20.  See id. at 312–13 (citing Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 690 (2004) (quoting 
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487)). 
 21.  See id. 
 22.  Id. at 313 (citing Altmann, 541 U.S. at 690–91; Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487–88; Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 [FSIA], 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012)). The Court also said that “[a]fter 
the enactment of the FSIA, the Act—and not the pre-existing common law—indisputably governs the 
determination of whether a foreign state is entitled to sovereign immunity.” Id.  
 23.  Id. at 308 (citing FSIA §§ 1330, 1602–11). 
 24.  Id. at 325. 
 25.  See FSIA § 1603(a). 
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characteristics, . . . and “entity” typically refers to an organization, rather 
than an individual.26 
 
In addition, the FSIA statutory terms “agency and instrumentality” 
refer to an entity which is a “separate legal person . . . .”27 According to the 
Court in Samantar, this definition ordinarily refers to entities, not to 
individual persons: 
 
The phrase “separate legal person, corporate or otherwise,” . . . could 
conceivably refer to a natural person, solely by virtue of the word 
“person.” But the phrase “separate legal person” typically refers to the 
legal fiction that allows an entity to hold personhood separate from the 
natural persons who are its shareholders or officers.28 
 
Moreover, an agency or instrumentality under the FSIA must be either 
“an organ of a foreign state” or an entity “a majority of whose shares or 
other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state.”29 According to the 
Court, “[i]t is similarly awkward to refer to a person as an ‘organ’ of the 
foreign state.”30 Finally, under the FSIA, an agency or instrumentality 
means an entity “which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as 
defined in [certain FSIA subsections], nor created under the laws of any 
third country.”31 According to the Court, this aspect of the “agency or 
instrumentality” definition: 
 
could not be applied at all to a natural person. A natural person cannot be 
a citizen of a State [under the applicable FSIA subsections], because 
those subsections refer to the citizenship of corporations and estates. Nor 
can a natural person be ‘created under the laws of any third country.’32 
 
Thus, the Court held that Congress did not intend to include individual 
officials in the meaning of “agency or instrumentality.”33 
 
 26.  Samantar, 560 U.S. at 315 (second ellipsis in original) (citing FSIA § 1603(b) &); BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 612 (9th ed. 2009)). 
 27.  FSIA § 1603(b)(1). 
 28.  Id. at 315 (emphasis added) (citing FSIA § 1603(b)(1)). 
 29.  Id. at 314 (quoting FSIA § 1603(b)(2)). 
 30.  Id. at 315 (citing FSIA § 1603(b)(2)). 
 31.  Id. at 314 (quoting FSIA § 1603(b)(3)). 
 32.  Id. at 315–16. 
 33.  Id. at 314–15.  
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The Court rejected defendant’s argument that the FSIA’s basic 
definition of foreign state can include individual officials because the 
definition itself is illustrative, not exclusive: 
 
[Defendant] argues that the definition of “foreign state” . . . sets out a 
nonexhaustive list that “includes” political subdivisions and agencies or 
instrumentalities but is not so limited . . . . . It is true that use of the word 
“include” can signal that the list that follows is meant to be illustrative 
rather than exhaustive. . . . But even if the list [defining foreign state] is 
merely illustrative, it still suggests that “foreign state” does not 
encompass officials, because the types of defendants listed are all 
entities.34 
 
Furthermore, the Court pointed out that had Congress intended to 
include individuals within the meaning of the term “foreign state,” it would 
have more directly stated its intent since it had done so in other parts of the 
FSIA.35 In particular, the Court explained that the FSIA’s tortious activity 
exception to foreign state immunity, unlike the “foreign state” definition, 
includes a specific reference to individual officials and employees.36 
According to the Court, “[i]f the term ‘foreign state’ by definition includes 
an individual acting within the scope of his office, the phrase ‘or of any 
official or employee . . .’ in [the FSIA tortious activity exception] would be 
unnecessary.”37 In addition, according to the Court, other FSIA provisions, 
such as those dealing with service of process and remedies, counsel against 
interpreting the “foreign state” definition to include individuals.38 
The Court also disagreed with defendant’s argument that “because 
state and official immunities are coextensive, Congress must have codified 
official immunity when it codified state immunity [in the FSIA].”39 This 
caveat relates to the fact that, according to the Restatement of Foreign 
Relations, the “immunity of a foreign state . . . extends to . . . any other 
public minister, official, or agent of the state with respect to acts performed 
in his official capacity if the effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to 
 
 34.  Id. at 316–17 (footnote omitted) (citing FSIA § 1603(a); Russell v. United States, 261 U.S. 
514 (1923)). 
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 318 (ellipsis in original) (citing FSIA § 1605(a)(5) (tortious activity exception); Dole 
Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 476–77 (2003)). 
 38.  Id. (“Congress made no express mention of service of process on individuals in § 1608(a) . . ., 
which governs service upon a foreign state or political subdivision.”); id. at 319 (“The Act's careful 
calibration of remedies among the listed types of defendants suggests that Congress did not mean to 
cover other types of defendants [i.e., individual officials] never mentioned in the text.”). 
 39.  Id. at 321. 
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enforce a rule of law against the state.”40 The Court also pointed out that 
the U.S. government had, in the past, suggested immunity for officials even 
though the state did not enjoy immunity under the FSIA.41 In sum, the 
Court found “little reason to presume that when Congress set out to codify 
state immunity, it must also have, sub silentio, intended to codify official 
immunity.”42 
Furthermore, the Court noted that the legislative history of FSIA does 
not reflect that Congress intended to include individual officials within the 
scope of the statute.43 In particular, the Court emphasized that Congress did 
not intend the FSIA to remove the State Department’s role in foreign 
official immunity decisions.44 
Finally, the Supreme Court dismissed the argument that “artful 
pleading” by plaintiffs who chose to proceed against the foreign official 
under the common law would make the FSIA “optional.” In this regard, the 
Court said that: 
 
Even if a suit is not governed by the Act, it may still be barred by foreign 
sovereign immunity under the common law. And not every suit can 
successfully be pleaded against an individual official alone. Even when a 
plaintiff names only a foreign official, it may be the case that the foreign 
state itself, its political subdivision, or an agency or instrumentality is a 
required party, because that party has “an interest relating to the subject 
of the action” and “disposing of the action in the person’s absence 
may . . . as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to 
protect the interest.” . . . If this is the case, and the entity is immune from 
suit under the FSIA, the district court may have to dismiss the suit, 
regardless of whether the official is immune or not under the common 
law.45 
 
 40.  Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 66 (AM. LAW INST. 
1965)) (italics in original). 
 41.  Id. at 321–22. 
 42.  Id. at 322. 
 43.  Id. at 323 (“[T]he legislative history points toward an intent to leave official immunity outside 
the scope of the Act. . . . And although questions of official immunity did arise in the pre-FSIA period, 
they were few and far between. The immunity of officials simply was not the particular problem to 
which Congress was responding when it enacted the FSIA.” (footnote omitted)). 
 44.  Id. (“We have been given no reason to believe that Congress saw as a problem, or wanted to 
eliminate, the State Department's role in determinations regarding individual official immunity.”). 
 45.  Id. at 324–25 (footnote omitted) (first ellipsis in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 
19(a)(1)(B)). And in a subsequent passage, the Court said: “We are thus not persuaded that our 
construction of the statute's text should be affected by the risk that plaintiffs may use artful pleading to 
attempt to select between application of the FSIA or the common law. And we think this case, in which 
respondents have sued petitioner in his personal capacity and seek damages from his own pockets, is 
properly governed by the common law because it is not a claim against a foreign state as the Act defines 
that term.” Id. at 325. 
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Accordingly, regardless of how the plaintiff originally pleads her case, the 
foreign state may be determined to be a required party. If the foreign state 
is a required party, the state may be found immune under the FSIA. This 
finding, in turn, will lead to the termination of the suit regardless of the 
official’s immunity status under the common law. In addition, the Court 
found that in certain suits against foreign officials, the state may be the real 
party in interest. And, where that is the case, the FSIA would apply 
regardless of how the plaintiff originally pleaded her case.46 Under the facts 
of Samantar, the Court concluded that the common law applied because the 
suit was both directed against and sought damages from Samantar in his 
personal capacity; however, the court remanded the case back to the district 
court to decide whether defendant was ultimately entitled to immunity.47 
II.  POST-SAMANTAR CIRCUIT SPLIT 
In the approximately five years since Samantar was decided, a split 
has emerged among the federal appellate circuits on two significant issues 
related to determinations of conduct-based, foreign official immunity: (1) 
the degree of deference courts should give to an SOI by the executive 
branch; and (2) whether there is a jus cogens exception to immunity for 
certain grave, international human rights abuses. The differing approaches 
taken by the Fourth and Second Circuits illustrate the substance of the 
circuit split. 
 
 46.  Id. at 325 (in particular, the Court said that “it may be the case that some actions against an 
official in his official capacity should be treated as actions against the foreign state itself, as the state is 
the real party in interest”). 
 47.  Id. at 325–26. See also supra note 45. 
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 A. The Fourth Circuit: Yousuf v. Samantar48 (“Samantar II”) 
On remand from the Supreme Court decision in Samantar, the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found that the executive 
branch’s SOI expressly opposing immunity for defendant Samantar 
(“Defendant”) was entitled to considerable deference and denied Defendant 
immunity under the common law. In particular, according to the Fourth 
Circuit: 
 
[I]n denying Samantar’s subsequent motion to reconsider, the district 
court implied that it performed its own analysis and merely took the 
State Department’s view into account: “The Executive Branch has 
spoken on this issue and . . . [is] entitled to a great deal of deference. 
They don’t control but they are entitled to deference in this case.” The 
district court noted that both “the residency of the defendant” and “the 
lack of a recognized government” were factors properly considered in 
the immunity calculus.49 
 
The executive branch based its SOI on the overall impact it would 
have on the foreign relations of the United States as well as on two specific 
considerations. First, although Defendant was a former state official, no 
recognized government existed to request immunity or to comment on the 
official nature of his acts. Since immunity for acts rendered in an official 
capacity stems from the immunity of the foreign state itself, the executive 
branch reasoned that Defendant could not justifiably receive immunity 
unless a foreign state existed to claim it.50 Second, Defendant was a 
permanent legal resident of the United States who “enjoy[s] the protections 
 
 48.  699 F.3d 763 (4th Cir. 2012). For a summary of the status of the jos cogens exception prior to 
Samantar under the FSIA, see Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the U.S. 
Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 264–65 (2011)( “A related issue 
concerns the governmental character of abusive police conduct, including torture. When interpreting the 
FSIA, the Supreme Court has explained that “however monstrous such abuse undoubtedly may be,” it is 
a “peculiarly sovereign” activity shielded by immunity. Similarly, a number of circuit courts have held 
that even jus cogens violations by a state fall within the immunity provided for in the FSIA and have 
rejected arguments that a state constructively waives its immunity when it engages in such conduct. 
These conclusions are in tension with the holdings of several lower federal courts, which, prior to 
Samantar, held that torture and other jus cogens violations are not official acts and that, as a result, the 
individuals who commit them were not entitled to immunity under the FSIA or to dismissal under the 
act of state doctrine.” Id. (quoting Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 US 349, 361 (1993)(other citations 
omitted).  
 49.  Id. at 767–68 (third ellipsis and alteration in original) (quoting Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 
1:04CV1360 (LMB/JFA), 2011 WL 7445583, at *1 (E.D. Va. Feb 15, 2011)). 
 50.  Id. at 767. 
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of [United States] law,” and should, therefore, “be subject to the 
jurisdiction of [United States] courts.”51 
In Samantar II, the Fourth Circuit examined how much deference U.S. 
courts should give SOIs by the State Department in foreign official 
immunity cases.52 The court found that following the landmark Schooner 
Exchange case, which established the doctrine of absolute sovereign 
immunity,53 there had not been complete deference to the executive branch 
in cases involving questions of foreign sovereign immunity.54 By the 
1930s, however, courts had begun to regard executive branch 
determinations concerning foreign sovereign immunity as controlling.55 
Courts faced with a foreign sovereign immunity claim generally applied the 
two-step procedure involving the evaluation of whether the foreign state 
had requested an SOI from the executive branch, whether that request was 
granted, and if not, whether it (the court) believed immunity should be 
granted based on established branch policy.56 According to the Fourth 
Circuit, the decision by the State Department to adopt the restrictive view 
of foreign sovereign immunity in the Tate Letter had little effect on courts’ 
deference to State Department SOIs.57 By the time Congress passed the 
FSIA in 1976, the “clearly established practice of judicial deference to 
executive immunity determinations had been expressed largely in admiralty 
cases.”58 
 
 51.  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 52.  Id. at 769–70. As part of this analysis, the Court recognized the two distinct immunities of 
head of state immunity and foreign official immunity, both of which were claimed by defendant 
Samantar. See id. 
 53.  Id. at 770 (“Foreign sovereign immunity, insofar as American courts are concerned, has its 
doctrinal roots in [Schooner Exchange], which ushered in nearly a century of ‘absolute’ or ‘classical’ 
immunity, ‘under which a sovereign [could not], without his consent, be made a respondent in the 
courts of another sovereign.’” (quoting Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of 
New York, 551 U.S. 193, 199 (2007))). 
 54.  Id. (“‘Absolute’ immunity for the foreign sovereign, however, is not to be confused with 
absolute judicial deference to the Executive Branch. In fact, during the lengthy period of absolute 
immunity, courts did not necessarily consider themselves obliged to follow executive pronouncements 
regarding immunity.”). The Court of Appeals noted that in 1921, in Berizzi Brothers, the United States 
Supreme Court found “that a steamship owned by a foreign sovereign was entitled to immunity despite 
the fact that the Secretary of State had expressed the opposite view earlier in the litigation.” Id. at 770–
71 (citing Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 576 (1926)).  
 55.  Id. at 771 (noting, for example, in the specific context of admiralty suits against foreign ships, 
“[i]t was not until the late 1930s—in the context of in rem actions against foreign ships—that judicial 
deference to executive foreign immunity determinations emerged as standard practice” (citing The 
Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); Republic of Mexico v. 
Hoffmann, 324 U.S. 30 (1945))). 
 56.  Id. (quoting Samantar, 560 U.S. at 312 (quoting Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 36)). 
 57.  Id. at 771 n.5 (citing Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 690 (2004)). 
 58.  Id. at 771–72. 
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In addition, the Fourth Circuit noted that the power to receive 
ambassadors is bestowed upon the executive branch under Article II, 
Section III of the U.S. Constitution. This provision, the court reasoned, 
impliedly confers the power to recognize foreign heads of state on the 
executive branch. It then held that because the State Department’s power to 
issue SOIs for heads of state is a constitutional power, those SOIs are 
entitled to absolute deference.59 In light of this constitutional pedigree and 
the wealth of precedent finding that executive branch guidance on head of 
state immunity questions binds courts, the Fourth Circuit determined that 
Defendant was not entitled to head of state immunity.60 
But because the constitutional considerations are different, the Court 
of Appeals determined that State Department guidance in the conduct-
based foreign official immunity context is not controlling, despite being 
entitled to “substantial weight.” For example, the Court explained that 
foreign official immunity cases “do not involve any act of recognition . . . 
rather, they simply involve matters about the scope of defendant’s official 
duties.”61 Significantly, the Court nevertheless recognized that the 
Executive Branch still plays an important advisory role in foreign official 
immunity cases because they implicate CIL and foreign policy 
considerations.62 In sum, the Court found that it affords complete deference 
to the State Department’s finding on head-of-state immunity but that 
regarding conduct-based immunity, the Department’s view is “not 
controlling, but it carries substantial weight in our analysis.”63 
Finally, to determine whether Defendant was entitled to foreign 
official immunity, the Fourth Circuit looked to immunity law in the United 
States and internationally as well as to executive branch guidance. The 
court noted that international law, in particular, has played an influential 
 
 59.  See id. at 772.  
 60.  See id. (“[T]he State Department's pronouncement as to head-of-state immunity is entitled to 
absolute deference. The State Department has never recognized Samantar as the head of state for 
Somalia; indeed, the State Department does not recognize the Transitional Federal Government or any 
other entity as the official government of Somalia, from which immunity would derive in the first place. 
The district court properly deferred to the State Department's position that Samantar be denied head-of-
state immunity.”).  
 61.  Id. at 773. 
 62.  Id. (“This is not to say, however, that the Executive Branch has no role . . . These immunity 
decisions turn upon principles of customary international law and foreign policy, areas in which the 
courts respect . . . the views of the Executive Branch. . . . With respect to foreign official immunity, the 
Executive Branch still informs the court about the diplomatic effect of the court's exercising jurisdiction 
over claims against an official of a foreign state, and the Executive Branch may urge the court to grant 
or deny official-act immunity based on such considerations.” (citations omitted) (citing Peter B. 
Rutledge, Samantar, Official Immunity and Federal Common Law, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 589, 
606 (2011))). 
 63.  Id. 
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role in foreign sovereign immunity jurisprudence and legislation 
throughout U.S. history.64 In addition, the United States, and in particular 
the Supreme Court, has adopted “the international law principle that 
sovereign immunity, which belongs to a foreign state, extends to an 
individual official acting on behalf of that foreign state.”65 However, “[a] 
foreign official or former head-of-state will . . . not be able to assert this 
immunity for private [or individual] acts that are not arguably attributable 
to the state, such as drug possession or fraud.”66 In addition, the court 
concluded that under international law, jus cogens violations are essentially 
private acts for which official immunity may not be warranted: 
 
There has been an increasing trend in international law [following the 
Pinochet decision] to abrogate foreign official immunity for individuals 
who commit acts, otherwise attributable to the State, that violate jus 
cogens norms—i.e., they commit international crimes or human rights 
violations[.]67 
 
Furthermore, according to the Fourth Circuit, conduct-based foreign 
official immunity does not extend to violations of jus cogens norms, but 
head of state immunity still applied notwithstanding these violations.68 In 
sum, the Fourth Circuit held that based on United States and international 
 
 64.  Id. at 773–74. 
 65.  Id. at 774 (citing Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)). The Court of Appeals 
elaborated that “[b]y the time the FSIA was enacted, numerous domestic courts had embraced the 
notion, stemming from international law, that ‘[t]he immunity of a foreign state . . . extends to . . . any . 
. . public minister, official, or agent of the state with respect to acts performed in his official capacity if 
the effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to enforce a rule of law against the state.’” Id. (all 
alternations in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 66(f) (AM. 
LAW INST. 1965)).  
 66.  Id. at 775 (citing In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988)). 
 67.  Id. at 777 (citing Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the U.S. 
Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 236–37 (2011)). The Court of 
Appeals noted that “[a] number of decisions from foreign national courts have reflected a willingness to 
deny official-act immunity in the criminal context for alleged jus cogens violations, most notably the 
British House of Lords’ Pinochet decision denying official-acts immunity to a former Chilean head of 
state accused of directing widespread torture.” Id. (citing R v. Bartle, ex parte Pinochet [1999] 1 AC 
147 (HL) 203–06 (appeal taken from Eng.). Interestingly, in the civil context, the Court of Appeals 
pointed out that “[s]ome foreign national courts have pierced the veil of official-acts immunity to hear 
civil claims alleging jus cogens violations, but the jus cogens exception appears to be less settled in the 
civil context.” Id. (citing Cass., sez. un., 11 marzo 2004, n. 5044, Foro it. 2004, I (It.) [Ferrini v. 
Republic of Germany]); Jones v. Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26 [24], [2007] 1 AC (HL) 270 (Lord 
Bingham of Cornhill LJ) (appeal taken from Eng.)). The Court interpreted Jones as “rejecting [a] jus 
cogens exception to foreign official immunity in [the] civil context.” Id.  
 68.  Id. (“American courts have generally [found] that jus cogens violations are not legitimate 
official acts and therefore do not merit foreign official immunity but still recognizing that head-of-state 
immunity, based on status, is of an absolute nature and applies even against jus cogens claims.”). 
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law, foreign officials “are not entitled to foreign official immunity for jus 
cogens violations, even if they were performed in their official capacity.”69 
Finally, the Fourth Circuit gave substantial weight to the factors 
underlying the State Department’s executive guidance that Defendant 
ought to be denied immunity.70 In conclusion, the Court of Appeals held 
that Defendant was not entitled to conduct-based, foreign official immunity 
under the common law because of both the various jus cogens violations 
and the particular executive branch guidance involved in the case.71 
B. The Second Circuit: Rosenberg v. Pasha 
Plaintiffs-appellants (“Plaintiffs”) were American and Israeli citizens 
who were victims or relatives of victims injured or killed during terrorist 
attacks in Mumbai, India. Plaintiffs alleged that the attacks themselves 
were committed, in part, by Pakistani nationals of Lashkar-E-Taiba (“Le-
T”), a United States government-designated terrorist organization.72 
Plaintiffs further alleged that the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate of 
Pakistan (“ISI”), and in particular two of its former Directors General, 
Ahmed Shuja Pasha and Nadeem Taj (“Pasha and Taj”), carried out 
intelligence gathering for the Pakistani military and essentially coordinated 
the attacks with Le-T.73 Plaintiffs brought suit under the TVPA, the ATS, 
and the Antiterrorism Act.74 The district court had held that Pasha and Taj 
were protected from suit by common law sovereign immunity, basing its 
decision on the SOI provided by the State Department which stipulated that 
Pasha and Taj were foreign officials acting within the scope of their 
positions.75 Plaintiffs, relying upon the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
Samantar II, argued that immunity should not apply to defendants Pasha 
and Taj because they committed jus cogens violations; moreover, plaintiffs 
argued that under Samantar II, SOIs themselves are not entitled to absolute 
 
 69.  Id. The Fourth Circuit also found that “Congress's enactment of the TVPA, and the policies it 
reflects, [is] both instructive and consistent with our view of the common law regarding these aspects of 
jus cogens.” Id. 
 70.  Id. at 777–78. For a list of the factors put forth by the State Department in suggesting 
Samantar be denied immunity, see supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
 71.  Id. at 778. 
 72.  Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 Fed. Appx. 22, 23 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 73.  Id. at 23. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. The District Court had earlier found that ISI itself should receive immunity under the 
FSIA since no exception (to immunity) applied and the United States executive branch had suggested 
immunity. See Rosenberg v. Lashkar-e-Taiba, 980 F. Supp. 2d 336, 342–43 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Based 
on the pleadings and the record in these actions, the Court is satisfied that the ISI has met its burden 
under the FSIA and the ISI is entitled to immunity from these actions.”). 
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deference.76 However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
Pasha was not persuaded. The Second Circuit held that under Matar v. 
Dichter, absolute deference to the executive branch is warranted in foreign 
official immunity claims. It also held that, under Matar, jus cogens 
violations do not overcome these immunity claims.77 Specifically, the 
Second Circuit disagreed with plaintiffs’ contention that Matar had been 
overruled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Samantar. According to the 
Second Circuit, the Supreme Court did not address common law official 
immunity in any significant way and, therefore, did not overrule Matar. On 
the contrary, the Second Circuit pointed out, the Supreme Court noted that 
“[w]hether [the foreign official] may be entitled to immunity under the 
common law . . . [is a] matter [ ] to be addressed in the first instance . . . on 
remand.”78 Therefore, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
opinion finding conduct-based, foreign official immunity for defendants 
Pasha and Taj in accordance with the executive branch’s SOI.79 
III. OTHER KEY, POST-SAMANTAR CASES 
Several federal district court opinions in the wake of Samantar have 
expounded upon its holding and rationale related to foreign official 
immunity. While some of these cases address the issues pertaining to the 
split described in the preceding Part (Part II), others shed light on certain 
strategies plaintiffs may adopt to potentially overcome the immunity of 
foreign officials. This Part will examine cases involving the conduct-based 
immunity of foreign officials before turning to those implicating status-
based immunity. 
A. Foreign Official, Conduct-based Immunity Cases 
In Giraldo v. Drummond Co., Plaintiffs were legal representatives of 
individuals allegedly killed at the hands of a paramilitary group in 
 
 76.  Rosenberg, 577 Fed. Appx. at 23 (citing Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 773, 777). 
 77.  Id. (citing Matar v. Dichter, 563 F. 3d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
 78.  Id. at 24 (alterations in original) (quoting Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325–26 (2010)). 
Note that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had previously found that there is “no jus cogens 
exception to the FSIA.” Rosenberg, 980 F. Supp. 2d at 344 (citing Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 242–45 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
 79.  Rosenberg, 577 Fed. Appx. at 24. The Court of Appeals said that “Matar remains binding 
precedent in this Circuit, and in applying it, the District Court correctly determined that, in light of the 
Statement of Interest filed by the State Department recommending immunity for Pasha and Taj, the 
action must be dismissed.” Id. Regarding defendants/appellees, the District Court had said that “it is the 
position of the Executive Branch that defendants Pasha and Taj, former Directors General of the ISI, are 
entitled to foreign sovereign immunity under the common law as foreign officials who were sued in 
their official capacity for acts conducted in their official capacity. Under the common law on sovereign 
immunity, the Court’s inquiry ends here.” Rosenberg, 980 F. Supp. 2d at 343. 
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Columbia.80 They sought to compel the testimony of the former President 
of Columbia, Alvaro Uribe, concerning his alleged involvement with the 
paramilitary group during his presidency.81 The executive branch issued an 
SOI affirmatively recognizing the former president’s immunity from 
testifying about his official actions while president.82 
The District Court for the District of Columbia in Giraldo first noted 
that in cases where the executive branch issued an SOI affirmatively 
granting immunity to a former president, the traditional or historical 
practice had been for courts to defer to that guidance.83 The district court 
rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the testimony they sought related to 
conduct that had occurred before Uribe was president, reasoning that the 
testimony “still relate[d] to information he received and acts he took in his 
official capacity as a government official—[in this case as] the Governor of 
[the department of] Antioquia.”84 In response to the Plaintiffs’ argument 
that the former President’s conduct consisted of “unofficial” actions, the 
district court determined that “allegations of illegality do not serve to 
render an action unofficial for purposes of foreign official immunity. . . . 
[S]uch a rule [that illegal actions fall outside the scope of official 
immunity] would eviscerate the protection of foreign official immunity and 
would contravene federal law. . . .”85 
The district court also pointed out that under its own precedent even 
violations of jus cogens norms—which plaintiffs alleged the former 
president had perpetrated—do not fall outside the scope of foreign official 
immunity: “The D.C. Circuit has rejected the argument that jus cogens 
violations defeat foreign official immunity in the context of the [FSIA],” 
and the district court found this conclusion “instructive” even given 
Samantar’s holding that FSIA did not apply to individual, foreign official 
 
 80.  Giraldo v. Drummond Co., 808 F. Supp. 2d 247, 248 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 81. Id. Plaintiffs brought their claims against a certain corporation, its subsidiaries and employees 
for war crimes, crimes against humanity and extrajudicial killings under the ATS and TVPA. Id. 
Plaintiffs also sought testimony from the former president regarding conduct that transpired while he 
was a provincial governor in Columbia. Id. at 249. 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Id. (citing Samantar, 560 U.S. at 311). The District Court then observed, “In this case, the 
State Department has granted respondent's request for a suggestion of immunity and suggests that 
former President Uribe enjoys residual immunity as to information relating to acts taken or obtained in 
his official capacity as a government official. . . . Plaintiffs do not take issue with this standard [as 
reiterated in Samantar] for determining respondent's immunity [i.e., if the State Department grants 
immunity, the district court surrenders jurisdiction over the case].” Id. See also Abi Joudi & Azar 
Trading Corp. v. Cigna Worldwide Ins., 391 Fed. Appx. 173, 178–80 (3d Cir. 2010) (remanding foreign 
official immunity claims in order to allow parties to argue these claims under the common law in light 
of Samantar and in order to allow executive branch to provide guidance concerning these claims).  
 84.  Giraldo, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 249–50. 
 85.  Id. at 249–50. 
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immunity claims.86 The district court reasoned that a jus cogens exception 
would “place a strain upon our courts [in the form of innumerous human 
rights lawsuits] and our diplomatic relations, [and] it would also eviscerate 
any protection that foreign official immunity affords.”87 Basing its 
reasoning for declining to recognize this exception on its own precedent as 
well as foreign precedent, the court commented that: 
 
As soon as a party alleged a violation of a jus cogens norm, a court 
would have to determine whether such a norm was indeed violated in 
order to determine immunity—i.e., the merits would be reached. When 
the foreign official is the defendant, there will effectively be no 
immunity—a civil action by definition challenges the legality of the 
official’s acts.88 
 
In sum, the District Court for the District of Columbia found that there was 
not adequate precedent to support plaintiff’s argument for a jus cogens 
exception.89 
In Smith v. Ghana Commercial Bank, Ltd., the District Court for the 
District of Minnesota decided, in a case against a foreign official for fraud 
 
 86.  Id. at 250 (citing Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). The District 
Court stated, “Because the court [in Belhas] decided the issue under the FSIA, that holding does not 
squarely govern the issue here regarding the effect of a jus cogens violation on foreign official 
immunity for purposes of the common law. But as the Supreme Court noted in Samantar, rules that 
appellate courts developed for foreign official immunity under the FSIA ‘may be correct as a matter of 
common-law principles.’ . . . And the D.C. Circuit's reasoning in Belhas is instructive.” Id. (quoting 
Samantar, 560 U.S. at 322 n.17). 
 87.  Id.  
 88.  Id. In terms of foreign precedent, the District Court stated that “[B]oth the Second and 
Seventh circuits have found [t]he Executive Branch's determination that a foreign leader should be 
immune from suit even where the leader is accused of acts that violate jus cogens norms is established 
by a suggestion of immunity. . . . Even the Supreme Court has suggested that jus cogens violations are 
still official actions.” Id. at 251 (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original) (citing 
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 361 (1993); Matar v. Dichter, 563 F. 3d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 2009); Ye 
v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir.2004)). 
 89.  Id. (“[Plaintiffs] contend that [President Uribe] acted within his official capacity but illegally, 
and hence such unlawful acts [involving violations of jus cogens norms] were outside the scope of his 
official duties by definition. But that position is just what Belhas and other cases reject. Accordingly, 
plaintiffs' allegations of jus cogens violations do not defeat former President Uribe's immunity.”) 
Finally, the District Court found that if plaintiffs were to seek information related to unofficial actions 
taken by the former Columbian president, they first needed to investigate whether there may be 
alternative sources for this information. Id. at 252 (“The Court agrees with the position of the United 
States that, although immunity is not available with respect to information relating to acts taken or 
obtained by former President Uribe outside of his official capacity as a government official, comity and 
foreign relations interests nonetheless require that all other reasonably available means to acquire such 
information be exhausted before a deposition is permitted. Accordingly, to the extent plaintiffs were to 
seek information unrelated to acts taken or obtained in respondent's official capacity, they must first 
show that the information is both necessary and unavailable through other means.”).  
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involving no executive branch guidance (i.e., the official was Ghana’s 
attorney general at the time), that the appropriate test for foreign official 
immunity under the common law was the rule contained in Section 66 of 
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law: “‘[t]he immunity of a 
foreign state . . . extends to . . . any other public minister, official, or agent 
of the state with respect to acts performed in his official capacity if the 
effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to enforce a rule of law against 
the state.”90 In particular, the Court said that: 
 
The rule stated in Restatement § 66(f) is consistent with the principles 
underlying the common law of foreign sovereign immunity. Allowing an 
American court to reach the merits of a suit against a public official for 
acts taken on behalf of the foreign state, and, thereby enforcing a rule of 
law against the foreign state, would certainly affect the “power and 
dignity” of that foreign state.91 
 
In addition, the Court applied the rule from Samantar that certain official 
capacity suits should be regarded as “actions against the foreign state itself, 
as the state is the real party in interest.”92 Based on these rules, the Court in 
Smith found that the foreign official, who was Ghana’s attorney general at 
the time, enjoyed immunity from suit because the plaintiff’s allegations 
concerned conduct by the attorney general in his official capacity.93 
Finally, the court found that declaring that the attorney general of 
Ghana was not entitled to foreign official immunity and exercising 
jurisdiction over him would mean “‘enforc[ing] a rule of law against’ the 
Republic of Ghana.”94 In the end, the court held that the Attorney General 
 
 90. No. 10–4655 (DWF/JJK), 2012 WL 2930462, at *9 (D. Minn. June 18, 2012) (all alterations 
in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 66(f) (AM. LAW INST. 
1965)). 
 91.  Id. at *9. 
 92.  Id. (quoting Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010)). 
 93.  Id. at *10 (“Plaintiff's allegations against Ghana's Attorney General render the Republic of 
Ghana the real party in interest here and show that Plaintiff seeks to hold the Attorney General liable for 
acts performed in his official capacity. Indeed, Plaintiff states in his Complaint that references to 
Defendants [including the Attorney General] throughout his Complaint are to be construed as 
allegations concerning acts within the scope of Defendants' official duties.”). These duties primarily 
consisted of the attorney general’s decision whether or not to pursue criminal charges against those 
individuals who allegedly defrauded plaintiff (i.e., kept him from his money). Id. 
 94.  Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 66(f) (AM. LAW INST. 
1965)). See also id. (“At the core of the Attorney General's responsibilities as an agent of the Ghanaian 
government is making decisions about how to pursue those accused of wrongdoing within Ghana's 
territory. Were this Court to exercise jurisdiction, examine the merits of Plaintiff's claim that Ghana's 
Attorney General allowed some unsavory characters to get away with fraud [and in the process take his 
money], and conclude that the Attorney General's alleged failure to act subjected him to liability, we 
would certainly be enforcing some rule of law against the Republic of Ghana.”). 
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of Ghana was entitled to conduct-based, foreign official immunity under 
the common law.95 
Similarly, in Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia found that a suit against foreign officials 
should be treated as a suit against the foreign state because the state (i.e., 
Iran) was the “real party in interest.”96 In Mohammadi, plaintiffs sued then-
President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s head of state, Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, along with Iran and its Revolutionary Guard 
for torture, unlawful imprisonment, and extrajudicial killing under the 
TVPA, ATS, and FSIA.97 The Court in Mohammadi found that Iran and the 
Revolutionary Guard were immune from suit under the FSIA. The Court 
reasoned that the terrorism exception to FSIA did not apply because 
plaintiffs were not nationals of the United States when the alleged torture 
and extrajudicial killings were committed.98 
Second, with regard to plaintiffs’ claims against then-President 
Ahmadinejad and the Ayatollah Khamenei, the Court found that the state of 
Iran was the “real party in interest” and that because Iran had immunity 
under FSIA, the Court lacked jurisdiction. According to the Court, 
Samantar left undecided the issue of which “actions against an official in 
his official capacity should be treated as actions against the foreign state 
itself.”99 Though the Court refrained from determining exactly which 
actions against an official in his official capacity should be treated in this 
way, the Court did “conclude[] that in this case the foreign state of Iran is 
the real party in interest, not Khamenei or Ahmadinejad.”100 
The court reached its conclusion that Iran was the “real party in 
interest” by looking to the nature of plaintiffs’ allegations and the overall 
 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  947 F. Supp. 2d 48, 72 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 97.  Id. at 54. For the role of Ayatollah Khamenei in Iran’s government, see Akbar Ganji, Who is 
Ali Khamenei? The Worldview of Iran’s Supreme Leader, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2013, at 24, 24 
(“But the dominant figure in Iranian politics is not the president but rather the supreme leader, 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The Iranian constitution endows the supreme leader with tremendous 
authority over all major state institutions, and Khamenei, who has held the post since 1989, has found 
many other ways to further increase his influence. Formally or not, the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches of the government all operate under his absolute sovereignty; Khamenei is Iran’s head 
of state, commander in chief, and top ideologue.”). 
 98. Mohammadi, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 68 (“Since neither the claimants nor the non-plaintiff victim 
(Akbar) were ‘nationals of the United States’ from 1999–2006, during which time the defendants 
perpetrated the relevant acts of torture and extrajudicial killing, the plaintiffs do not satisfy the 
jurisdictional requirements of the FSIA's terrorism exception [to immunity].”). 
 99.  Id. at 72 (quoting Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010)).  
 100.  Id. Interestingly, the Court did not subject the claims against either then-current President 
Ahmadinejad or the Ayatollah Khamenei to head of state immunity analysis.  
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theory of the case. The Court emphasized that “plaintiffs make clear, both 
in their Third Amended Complaint and in their briefing, that they are suing 
defendants Khamenei and Ahmadinejad in their official, as opposed to their 
personal, capacities. . . . It is [therefore] apparent that . . . any actions taken 
by Khamenei and Ahmadinejad were actions of the Iranian ‘regime.’”101 
B. Status-Based, Head of State Immunity Cases 
In Manoharan v. Rajapaksa,102 a decision from the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the plaintiffs, who 
were relatives of victims of alleged extrajudicial killings in Sri Lanka, 
brought suit against defendant, the President of Sri Lanka, under the 
TVPA. Citing Samantar, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
first applied the two-part test for foreign official immunity from The 
Schooner Exchange. According to the court, “Under the first step of that 
procedure, the only one that is relevant here, ‘the diplomatic representative 
of the sovereign could request a ‘suggestion of immunity’ from the State 
Department,’ and ‘[i]f the request was granted, the district court 
surrendered its jurisdiction.’”103 
 
 101.  Id. at 72 (citations omitted). See also Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya, 930 F. Supp. 2d 17, 
34–35 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[T]o determine whether a suit against a foreign official is governed by the 
FSIA, this Court must look to whether the suit is against the official personally or whether the state is 
‘the real party in interest.’ If the suit is against the official personally, then the common law regarding 
sovereign immunity applies, but if the state is ‘the real party in interest,’ then the suit should be treated 
as an action against the foreign state itself to which the FSIA would apply. . . . Odhiambo’s suit against 
the individual defendants will be governed by the FSIA because the suit is in all respects a suit against 
the Kenyan government. This is a breach of contract case and the only contract at issue is between 
Odhiambo and the Kenyan government. . . . Further, unlike the plaintiff in Samantar, Odhiambo has 
sued the individual defendants in their official capacities. . . . And any damages that Odhiambo recovers 
in this suit will be payable by the Kenyan government and not from the individual defendants’ ‘own 
pockets.’ . . . Therefore, the Kenyan government is ‘the real party in interest’ and the suit against the 
individual defendants will be treated as one against the Republic of Kenya. The Court’s FSIA analysis 
thus applies to all defendants including the individuals.” (citations omitted)). The District Court in 
Odhiambo determined that Kenya was immune from suit under the FSIA. See id. at 35.  
 102.  711 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 103.  Id. at 179 (alteration in original) (quoting Samantar, 560 U.S. at 311). For a discussion of the 
origins of the two-part test, see Manoharan v. Rajapaksa, 845 F. Supp. 2d 260, 262–63 (D.D.C. 2012). 
Also, the District Court in Rajapaksa based its decision to follow executive branch guidance on head of 
state immunity because the executive branch is more well-suited to evaluating the foreign policy 
implications of these immunity determinations: “As the Seventh Circuit explained [in Ye], ‘[t]he 
determination to grant (or not grant) immunity can have significant implications for this country's 
relationship with other nations. A court is ill-prepared to assess these implications and resolve the 
competing concerns the Executive Branch is faced with in determining whether to immunize a head of 
state.’ . . . This Court is not in a position to second-guess the Executive's determination that in this case, 
the nation's foreign policy interests will be best served by granting Defendant [and President of Sri 
Lanka] Rajapaksa head of state immunity while he is in office.” Id. at 266 (quoting Ye v. Zemin, 383 
F.3d 620, 626–27 (7th Cir. 2004)). One possible type of foreign policy implication stemming from head 
of state immunity determinations implicates the concern of reciprocity. See John Bellinger, Immunities, 
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In Manoharan, the diplomatic representative had requested an SOI 
and the U.S. State Department affirmatively granted it. As a result, the DC 
Circuit found that defendant was entitled to immunity. The court treated as 
“binding” the executive branch guidance granting head of state immunity 
to defendant.104 In addition, the D.C. Circuit found that neither the 
legislative history nor text of the TVPA indicated that it was meant to 
override the common law of head of state immunity.105 In conclusion, the 
court held that “[b]ecause, as a consequence of the State Department’s 
suggestion of immunity, the defendant is entitled to head of state immunity 
under the common law while he remains in office, and because the TVPA 
did not abrogate that common law immunity, the judgment of the district 
court dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint is affirmed.”106 
Similarly, in Tawfik v. Al-Sabah, the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York relied upon the first part of the two-part procedure 
described above to determine head of state immunity under the common 
law, which essentially meant treating the “State Department’s immunity 
decision[] [in the case as] mandatory . . . [and] binding and not subject to 
judicial review.”107 Plaintiffs in Tawfik were Egyptian citizens residing in 
Kuwait who were also members of a political organization that worked to 
further democratic governance in Egypt. They were arrested by the Kuwaiti 
police and allegedly subjected to torture, rape, and other abuses.108 
Plaintiffs sued various defendants, including the sitting head of state of 
Kuwait, Sheihk Al-Sabah.109 After obtaining a default judgment against 
Sheihk Al-Sabah, Plaintiffs requested a hearing on damages. However, 
before the hearing, the United States Department of State issued an SOI 
affirmatively granting immunity to Sheihk Al–Sabah.110 
 
available at <http://opiniojuris.org/2007/01/18/immunities/> (last visited 6/4/16) (The … official 
immunity rules the United States applies domestically [including head of state immunity] have 
important implications for how the United States and its officials are treated abroad. “) 
 104.  See Manoharan, 711 F.3d at 179 (citing Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438, 441 (D.C. Cir. 
1989)). Note that the Court did say that “[t]his case does not require us to decide what deference we 
should give to the State Department when the Department indicates that a defendant, whether a sitting 
head of state or otherwise, should not receive immunity.” Id. at 180 n.1. 
 105.  Id. at 179–80. 
 106.  Id. at 180 (footnote and emphasis omitted). 
 107.  Tawfik v. Al-Sabah, No. 11 Civ. 6455(ALC)(JCF), 2012 WL 3542204, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
22, 2012). 
 108.  Id. at *1. Plaintiffs were allegedly arrested at the request of the Egyptian President. See id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. at *1, *3. 
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The Court, relying in part upon Samantar, also found that the 
enactment of FSIA in 1976 did not alter the nature of sitting head of state 
immunity determinations: 
 
Since 1976, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the “FSIA”), rather 
than the prior common law framework, has governed the standards for 
determining whether foreign states are amenable to suit. . . . [T]he pre-
FSIA practice of judicial deference to the State Department’s immunity 
determinations, [however,] remains intact in the context of immunity for 
sitting heads of state.111 
 
Because the United States Department of State had issued an SOI granting 
immunity to the sitting head of state of Kuwait, Sheihk Al–Sabah, the 
District Court in Al-Sabah deferred absolutely to this executive branch 
determination.112 
Finally, in the post-Samantar case of Smith v. Ghana Commercial 
Bank, Ltd., also discussed above for its relevance to the foreign official 
immunity issue, since there was no executive SOI, the District Court 
decided on its own that the President of Ghana, who was another defendant 
in the case, was entitled to head of state immunity in a suit alleging fraud. 
In particular, the court refused to consider plaintiff’s claim that the 
President, John A. Mills, should have chosen different methods to identify 
and investigate the persons who allegedly defrauded him (i.e., the plaintiff). 
The court refused to consider plaintiff’s claim because it believed that by 
doing so, “it would be directly interfering with President Mills’ duty to 
enforce Ghana’s laws.”113 In addition, the court found that to prevent such 
interference, common law doctrines such as comity meant that “a head of 
state is immune from suit.”114 Finally, the court explained that “the head of 
state of a foreign sovereign [here, President Mills] enjoys immunity from 
suit at least to the same extent as the state itself, . . . and a foreign state 
 
 111.  Id. at *2 (citations omitted). 
 112.  Id. at *3. See also Habyarimana v. Kagame, 821 F.Supp. 2d 1244, 1260–64 (W.D. Okla. 
2011) (adopting approach of absolute deference to State Department SOI asserting head of state 
immunity for Rwandan President because of Executive’s primary role in foreign policy arena and 
separation of powers concerns).  
 113.  No. 10–4655 (DWF/JJK), 2012 WL 2930462, at *8 (D. Minn. June 18, 2012) (footnote and 
citations omitted). See also id. at *7 (noting that “[h]ere, because the State Department has filed no 
suggestion of immunity, this Court must address step two of the established procedure”—i.e., the court 
decides on its own whether immunity requirements have been met, basing its decision on whether the 
immunity ground has a basis in executive branch policy).  
 114.  Id. (“Comity and each nation's mutual respect for the exclusive and absolute authority within 
one another's respective territories are the backbone of the common law of foreign sovereign 
immunity.”). 
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[e.g., Ghana] cannot be subject to suit for decisions concerning whether or 
how to investigate fraud between private parties.”115 In sum, the court 
determined that the President of Ghana enjoyed immunity from suit.116 
Thus, the limited, extant federal district court case law that has emerged 
following Samantar reflects a reluctance to embrace a jus cogens exception 
to conduct-based, foreign official immunity or to deviate too far from 
executive branch guidance in this area. In addition, this jurisprudence has 
begun to develop certain criteria for deciding when the state is “the real 
party in interest” in a lawsuit again a foreign official (for example, an 
examination of the substance or “nature of the allegations”). When the state 
is the real party in interest, the FSIA and not the common law applies to the 
underlying immunity claim.  In the head-of-state immunity context, the 
post-Samantar jurisprudence appears to maintain the common law practice 
of deferring to the guidance of the executive branch on the question of 
immunity. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Four main issues emerging from the jurisprudence in the wake of 
Samantar are explored in this Part: (1) the implications of the recent 
circuit-split on the appropriate level of deference to executive SOIs in the 
conduct-based, foreign official immunity context, (2) the implications of 
the split concerning whether conduct-based immunity should be granted to 
foreign officials in cases of alleged jus cogens violations, (3) status-based, 
head of state immunity issues, and (4) strategic considerations for putative 
plaintiffs suing foreign officials for human rights abuses and other alleged 
wrongs in U.S. courts. 
A. The Split Concerning the “Weight” to Give Executive Branch Guidance: 
Conduct-Based, Foreign Official Immunity Context 
The circuit split regarding the amount of deference to give executive 
branch SOIs in the conduct-based, foreign official immunity context bears 
certain implications, including those related to fairness, deterrence, case 
predictability, and jurisprudential development. Because of the split, 
foreign official defendants in U.S. courts may, for example, receive 
different outcomes in similar cases, creating injustice or unfairness across 
cases and deterrence-related challenges. Deterrence-related challenges have 
the potential to exacerbate impunity for grave human rights violations. In 
addition, the split may make it increasingly difficult for litigants in certain 
 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
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courts to predict immunity determinations in individual cases. That 
unpredictability could impact the decision-making calculus for litigants and 
create associated inefficiencies (e.g., wasting scarce judicial and other 
resources, preventing or delaying further jurisprudential development, etc.). 
The Fourth Circuit has determined that executive branch SOIs in the 
conduct-based, foreign official immunity context are entitled to 
considerable or substantial deference, but the Second Circuit has held that 
these same SOIs are entitled to absolute deference.117 Accordingly, one can 
imagine a scenario in the wake of this split where two factually identical or 
substantially similar conduct-based, foreign official immunity cases are 
presented to the executive branch by the diplomatic representative of the 
foreign state (under the two-step procedure outlined above), and the 
executive branch recommends immunity in each case. This may be because 
the executive believes that the conduct in question, done while the foreign 
official was in office, consisted of official and state duties. One potential 
approach to such cases is that taken by the Second Circuit, which defers 
absolutely to the executive branch, by essentially adopting the executive’s 
view of whether the defendant/ foreign official is entitled to immunity. 
 
 117.  See supra notes 63 and 77 and accompanying text. For differing assessments by scholars on 
the proper weight courts should give executive branch guidance on the immunity question, compare 
Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case Against The State 
Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 915, 915 (2011) (rejecting executive branch “lawmaking” power to 
make individual foreign official immunity determinations that are binding on the judiciary) with Lewis 
S. Yelin, Head of State Immunity as Sole Executive Lawmaking, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 911, 911 
(2011) (arguing that the State Department’s practice of deciding head of state immunity is “an example 
of sole executive lawmaking, deriving from the President's constitutional responsibility as the only 
authorized representative of the United States in its relations with foreign states”). Professor Wuerth 
argued that inconsistencies may arise in individual foreign official immunity cases following Samantar 
if executive SOIs are given controlling weight; for example, “the executive branch sometimes [may 
suggest] immunity in a case where its prior policy was to deny immunity on essentially the same facts.” 
Wuerth, supra, at 945; see also id. (“If the executive suggestion system is retained in claims against 
individual officials [i.e., as is possible after Samantar], claims against states themselves will 
nevertheless still be governed by the FSIA with very little or no deference to the executive branch. But 
there are many issues of overlap in resolving these two types of claims, substantially raising the costs 
and likelihood of inconsistent adjudications.” (footnote omitted)). And, significantly, Professor Wuerth 
saw as one implication of inconsistent adjudications the “undermin[ing of] diplomatic objectives and 
the confidence of other countries.” Id. at 952. Finally, Professor Wuerth envisioned that the incentive 
“calculus” for putative plaintiffs would change in the wake of Samantar, thereby leading to an increase 
in cases: “Before Samantar, most courts had held that the FSIA covered individuals as well, leaving 
little or no opportunity for State Department suggestions of immunity. After Samantar, however, 
plaintiffs have greater incentives to sue both the state and an individual, especially if they expect the 
State Department to be sympathetic to their claim. Plaintiffs also have a greater incentive to sue the 
individual even if they believe the state is immune because the two cases could now be treated 
differently.” Id. at 948 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 949 (“In the government’s hands, immunity 
determinations are thus likely to be opaque and difficult to predict—increasing the incentives to sue 
individual defendants even if it appears likely they should be immune for suit. An increase in cases also 
increases the possibility of inconsistent adjudications. . . .”). 
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However, a different court adjudicating the other, substantially similar case 
could decide to follow the approach of the Fourth Circuit giving the 
executive immunity determination considerable or substantial deference 
and conducting its own independent immunity determination. Moreover, 
this latter court may decide to abrogate the executive determination of 
immunity because, for example, it believes some of the conduct in question 
was ultimately private in nature or because some of the conduct was 
performed before the official formally took office. 
Regardless of the reason for reversing a given executive immunity 
determination, the possibility that courts (or the executive, for that matter) 
may make divergent immunity determinations on the same or similar facts 
presents certain challenges. This has the potential to lead to perceived 
injustice across cases. Putative abusers and other wrongdoers may attempt 
to escape liability by obtaining a favorable immunity decision from the 
executive branch (i.e., if that branch’s guidance is found to be “absolute”). 
Not only does this lead to deterrence-related problems, but it also invites a 
return to the pre-FSIA traditions of politically-oriented appeals to the 
executive for immunity—as opposed to judicially-determined immunity 
outcomes based on pre-established rules and norms, such as those provided 
under the FSIA.118 The fervency of these appeals, of course, will only be 
heightened in conduct-based, foreign official immunity cases in which 
executive branch guidance is anticipated to be controlling in nature. Even 
in cases where deference to executive branch SOIs is less than controlling, 
 
 118.  Here, the discussion of human rights abuses refers to ones falling below the threshold of jus 
cogens violations, such as indiscriminate killings or pillaging. Jus cogens violations will be addressed 
later in the analysis. For the general idea that political pressure will be applied to the executive to 
influence its guidance related to immunity, see Curtis A. Bradley &. Lawrence R. Helfer, International 
Law and the U.S. Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 243–59 (2010) 
(“After Samantar, the question of whether federal courts should defer to the Executive’s view regarding 
immunity will be a key point of contention . . . At a minimum, foreign governments are likely to 
pressure the State Department to suggest immunity in a non-trivial number of cases, much as they did in 
the years prior to the FSIA’s adoption. Conversely, U.S. human rights advocates may urge the 
department to intervene on behalf of plaintiffs by indicating that immunity would not be appropriate.”). 
Id. at 259 (citing and quoting John B. Bellinger III, Ruling Burdens State Dept., Natl L J (June 28, 
2010)). Also, the deterrence equation may be influenced by other possible factors, such as the 
possibility of criminal prosecution, the deterioration in the reputation/ status of one’s country (and its 
accompanying impact on foreign relations), or even civil suits in other countries. But the deterrence 
impact from possible civil suits in the United States should not be underestimated because the United 
States has become a major forum for the adjudication of human rights claims with little or no 
connection to it. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Individual 
Officials and Human Rights Litigation, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 9, 10 (2010) (“Since Filartiga, plaintiffs 
from around the globe have relied on the ATS to sue in U.S. courts for human rights abuses. In many of 
these suits, as in Filartiga, a foreign plaintiff sues a foreign official for an alleged violation of 
international law committed on foreign soil.”). Finally, many current and former officials, including 
former heads of state, may want to travel to or even reside in the United States.  
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political pressure should still be rather strong. In turn, this pressure in 
individual foreign official cases and associated foreign policy 
considerations could itself result in inconsistent immunity determinations 
by the executive branch across cases. 
B. The Split on Jus Cogens Exceptions: Foreign Official, Conduct-Based 
Immunity Context 
Interestingly, in the years since Samantar was decided, a circuit split 
has emerged on whether to recognize an exception to conduct-based 
immunity for foreign officials in the case of alleged jus cogens violations. 
The Fourth Circuit, relying on its own and international precedent, 
determined that a jus cogens exception existed, while the Second Circuit 
concluded that immunity persevered even in the face of jus cogens 
violations. The Fourth Circuit has reasoned that jus cogens violations do 
not constitute “official acts” warranting conduct-based, foreign official 
immunity.119 The divergence that has developed on the jus cogens issue 
presents similar difficulties to the disagreement among the circuits about 
the proper weight to accord executive branch guidance on the foreign 
official immunity question (i.e., the “conduct-based” variety). For example, 
similar and rather evident perceptions of injustice may arise when one 
defendant who has committed heinous human rights abuses—torture, 
extrajudicial killings, genocide, and the like—receives immunity for his or 
her official acts while another court pierces the immunity veil, finds 
liability, and awards damages. In addition, any deterrent effects may 
become more attenuated when certain courts choose to grant immunity in 
the jus cogens context, and these effects may themselves be more 
consequential in light of the egregious nature of the conduct. However, the 
split that has developed surrounding the jus cogens exception to immunity 
in U.S. circuit courts may itself reflect the state of uncertainty in customary 
international law and among foreign national precedents on this question, 
particularly in the civil context.120 In any event, as other circuits further 
 
 119.  See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit); see also supra note 77 and 
accompanying text (Second Circuit). 
 120.  See Bradley & Helfer, supra note 118, at 243 (“International tribunals have yet to take a 
definitive position on whether there is a jus cogens exception to foreign official immunity in civil 
cases.”). See also id. at 259 (noting that “international law does not require that U.S. courts hear civil 
suits against foreign officials”). On a related note, Professors Bradley and Helfer also argued that “it is 
likely that [customary international law] will influence judicial assessments of common law immunity 
claims raised in human rights litigation after Samantar.” Id. at 272; see also Chimène Keitner, Foreign 
Official Immunity and the Baseline Problem, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 605, 612, 613 (2011) (“[In Jones v. 
Saudi Arabia], Lord Bingham observed that there is no overwhelming international consensus requiring 
states to exercise universal civil jurisdiction over serious international law violations. However, even if 
this were true, it does not mean that states are prohibited from exercising civil jurisdiction within the 
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develop their jurisprudence on this issue in the wake of Samantar, they 
will, in turn, contribute to the development of customary international law 
in this context. But any development in this area, at least in terms of the 
contribution from the United States, will be incremental and gradual unless 
and until the U.S. Supreme Court intervenes to resolve the circuit split or 
the U.S. Congress passes legislation providing a resolution. 
C. Head of State Immunity Issue 
In the wake of Samantar, American courts appear to agree that 
executive guidance is determinative on the question of status-based, head 
of state immunity. This viewpoint stems from the notions of comity and 
respect for another nation’s authority within its own territory as well as the 
 
[other] limits . . . Even if Lord Bingham's conclusion were correct, it would mean only that [the United 
Kingdom’s statute regarding foreign official immunity] is not . . . inconsistent with . . . international 
law. Although the United Kingdom's decision to grant individuals immunity under its [immunity 
statute] does count as state practice for the purpose of customary international law formation, that 
decision is not uniformly reflected in the legislative and judicial choices of other countries.” (footnote 
and internal quotation marks omitted)). Note that the Jones v. Saudi Arabia case was appealed to the 
European Court of Human Rights (the ECHR), and the ECHR essentially affirmed Lord Bingham’s 
earlier ruling in Jones under the United Kingdom’s state immunity act, which had found immunity from 
civil suit for torture allegedly perpetrated by a foreign government and its officials. See Emile 
MacKenzie, International Law in Brief: European Court of Human Rights Delivers Judgment on State 
Immunity in Jones v. United Kingdom (January 14, 2014), AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, (Jan. 23, 2014 
5:19 PM), https://www.asil.org/blogs/european-court-human-rights-delivers-judgment-state-immunity-
jones-v-united-kingdom-january-14> (“On January 14, 2014, the Fourth Section of the European Court 
of Human Rights (the Court) issued its judgment . . . in Jones and Others v. United Kingdom. The Court 
found that the United Kingdom (UK) had not violated the right of access to court under Article 6 § 1 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights when UK courts granted immunity to Saudi Arabia and its 
State officials, thus dismissing the Applicants’ [civil] claims for compensation for torture they allegedly 
suffered at the hands of Saudi Arabian officials. The Court stated that ‘measures taken by a State which 
reflect generally recognised rules of public international law on State immunity cannot in principle be 
regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction on the right of access to a court as embodied in 
Article 6 § 1.’ However, the Court concluded that ‘in light of the developments currently under way in 
this area of public international law, this is a matter which needs to be kept under review.’”); see also 
Sevrine Knuchel, State Immunity and the Promise of Jus cogens, 9 NW. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 149, 156 
(2011) (“So far, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the only international court to have 
dealt with the [separate] issue [of an exception to state immunity for gross human rights violations], has 
rejected the view that a grant of immunity to the respondent state in a damage claim for acts of torture 
violated the individual's right of access to a court guaranteed by the European Convention on Human 
Rights.”). More recently, the International Court of Justice in the Germany v. Italy case decided that 
there was no jus cogens exception to state immunity. See Alexander Orakhelashvili, International 
Decisions: Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy; Greece Intervening), 106 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 609, 609, 611–12 (2012) (“[T]he International Court of Justice decided that, by allowing civil 
claims against Germany for wartime [World War II] atrocities to proceed before Italian courts, the 
Italian Republic had violated its obligation to respect Germany's sovereign immunity. . . . Turning to 
Italy's claim that the German acts in question violated jus cogens and were thus not entitled to 
immunity, the Court disagreed, finding no conflict between jus cogens and rules of state immunity.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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executive branch’s constitutional power to receive and appoint 
ambassadors.121 The conclusion is also grounded in a desire to maintain 
cordial relations among states and to avoid any reciprocal, negative 
consequences for American heads of state travelling abroad.122 Finally, 
executive branch SOIs are binding because the branch may be better suited 
to evaluate the foreign policy considerations underpinning head of state 
immunity determinations.123And, notably, even when the executive branch 
does not provide an SOI in a case involving a claim of head of state 
immunity, the court’s own analysis related to the immunity question must 
be based on previous executive policies and grounds for bestowing 
immunity (e.g., as evidenced in earlier SOIs from similar contexts).124 
Though courts in the wake of Samantar have acknowledged in dicta 
that it may be possible to pierce the immunity veil for heads of state in the 
case of conduct committed in a “private capacity,”125 no post-Samantar 
case appears to have done so. In addition, head of state immunity may be 
abrogated if the U.S. government does not recognize the official as head of 
state (or does not recognize the government for which the head of state 
serves).126 And in the FSIA era—and ostensibly continuing following 
Samantar—the foreign state could waive the immunity of its head.127 
Finally, the resolution of sitting head of state immunity questions in 
the United States appears to align with that of customary international law 
(at least in the criminal context).128 For example, the Arrest Warrant of 11 
April 2000 case by the International Court of Justice, though it involved a 
sitting foreign minister, likely supports the general proposition that 
immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of a foreign state attaches to 
incumbent heads of state. However, similar exceptions to this general 
 
 121.  See supra note 114 and accompanying text; see also supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 122.  See supra notes 103, 114 and accompanying text. 
 123.  See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 124.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 56, 112 and accompanying 
text.  
 125.  See, e.g., Smith v. Ghana Comm. Bank, Ltd., No. 10–4655 (DWF/JJK), 2012 WL 2930462, at 
*8 (D. Minn. June 18, 2012). 
 126.  See supra notes 50, 60 and accompanying text. 
 127.  See Christopher Totten, Head-of-State and Foreign Official Immunity in the United States 
after Samantar: A Suggested Approach, 34 FORDHAM INT’L. L. J. 332, 347–48 (2011); Lafontant v. 
Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 211 (S.D. Fl. 1993). 
No cases in the post-Samantar head of state immunity context appear to suggest that waiver of 
immunity by the foreign state is no longer available.  
 128.  BETH VAN SCHAAK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ENFORCEMENT 1063 (3d ed. 2014) (“The ICJ held [in the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 case] that 
under customary international law, sitting foreign ministers enjoy full immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction of another state . . . .”). 
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immunity rule exist, such as a waiver by the home state allowing 
prosecution in a third state as well as prosecutions by international 
tribunals.129 
D. Post-Samantar Strategies for Plaintiffs 
With regard to incumbent heads of state asserting status-based 
immunity, obtaining a waiver of immunity from the foreign government is 
one way to overcome that official’s immunity (and perhaps the most certain 
path). Short of obtaining a waiver, putative plaintiffs could apply pressure 
on the executive branch of the United States to issue an SOI declining 
immunity, whether by highlighting a particularly abhorrent series of human 
rights abuses committed under the head of state’s supervision or by 
recommending that the U.S. government decline to recognize the 
individual’s status as head of state or government.130 Finally, before both 
executive branch officials and in court, plaintiffs attempting to sue heads of 
state may argue that the conduct in question is purely private in nature and 
not connected in any way to the head’s public duties. 
The post-Samantar jurisprudence suggests several other tactics for 
potential plaintiffs bringing human rights or other suits against foreign 
officials who have asserted conduct-based immunity.131 As in the status-
based, head of state immunity context, a waiver of immunity by the 
official’s home state could be obtained, or pressure could be brought to 
bear against the executive branch because the official is not entitled to 
immunity, whether because the conduct was “private” in nature or because 
the conduct occurred prior to the official’s assumption of office.132 The 
 
 129.  Id. The ICJ noted in dicta that “there were three ways that a Foreign Minister could be held 
accountable for violations of international criminal law while still in office. First, the home state of the 
Foreign Minister could prosecute him. Second, the state could waive the immunity, thus allowing 
another state to prosecute him. Third, the immunity was not valid against a prosecution undertaken by 
an international tribunal.” Id. (citing Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 
Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Feb. 14)). 
 130.  See supra notes 60, 118 and accompanying text. 
 131.  For example, these suits could be brought under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 
(“TVPA”). See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (subjecting defendant to potential civil liability for torture and 
extrajudicial killing). 
 132.  For the idea that there may be a jus cogens exception to foreign official immunity, see supra 
note 67 and accompanying text. For the waiver possibility, albeit in the related head of state context, see 
supra note 127. See also Chimène Keitner, Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar, VAND. J. TRANS. 
L. 837, 855 (2011) (noting that if the foreign government recognized by the United States has not 
requested conduct-based immunity, “or if the foreign state has waived immunity, then the consensus 
appears to be that there should be no immunity, because immunity is for the benefit of the state, not the 
individual”). Note that Professor Keitner puts forth a list of five questions that can be asked “in order to 
determine whether or not a particular individual who is not covered by an existing treaty or statute is 
entitled to conduct-based immunity as a matter of common law.” Id. at 855–58. In addition to waiver, 
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“private” conduct may consist of particularly heinous human rights abuses, 
including jus cogens violations. 
But in the post-Samantar jurisprudential landscape, there is 
uncertainty about whether the executive branch’s guidance on the foreign 
official, conduct-based immunity question will be viewed as “binding” by a 
court.133 There is also uncertainty about whether courts will find a jus 
cogens exception to this type of immunity.134 Concerning the proper weight 
for courts to accord executive guidance, for plaintiffs who “lose” on the 
foreign official immunity question before the executive, there may still be 
an additional opportunity following Samantar for plaintiffs to argue 
successfully in court that immunity is not warranted. This opportunity 
would exist in those situations where courts view executive branch 
guidance as entitled to some deference but not controlling deference. For 
those plaintiffs who “win” on the immunity question before the executive, 
there is the also the possibility, however, that these courts will overturn the 
executive’s finding. In addition, for plaintiffs who obtain executive branch 
guidance on the foreign official immunity question, whether favorable or 
not, there is also the possibility in the wake of Samantar that this guidance 
will be essentially determinative (i.e., because the particular court will view 
it as binding). In these courts, plaintiffs who obtain a favorable immunity 
determination from the executive will be able to assert and have their 
claims heard and possibly obtain a damages award. These different judicial 
approaches to the treatment of executive branch guidance in the wake of 
Samantar suggest plaintiffs may want to engage, to the extent possible, in 
strategic “forum shopping;” for example, selecting a court that is most 
likely to “pierce” the immunity veil and address the merits of the plaintiffs 
claims (i.e., in those cases where the executive guidance is unfavorable), or 
choosing a court that is most likely to uphold the executive’s determination 
(i.e., in those cases where the executive guidance is favorable).135 Such an 
approach may also be warranted in light of the different court approaches 
to the jus cogens exception. Though such a “forum-shopping” strategy may 
 
these questions relate to whether the conduct by the foreign official was attributable to the state, 
whether the conduct was performed with actual authority, whether the defendant is present within the 
U.S. at the time of arrest or service, and whether Congress has attached legal consequences to the 
conduct. Id. For support for the notion that conduct-based immunity would not apply to conduct 
performed prior to the official’s assumption of office, see supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 133.  See supra notes 63, 77 and accompanying text. 
 134.  See supra notes 69, 77 and accompanying text. 
 135.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2012) (generally basing proper venue on defendant’s place of 
residence/domicile and the location of where the relevant conduct occurred); see also 28 U.S.C. § 
1391(c)(3) (2012) (“[A] defendant not resident in the United States may be sued in any judicial district . 
. . .” (emphasis added)). 
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make good, practical sense from a litigation standpoint, it is not without 
certain potential consequences. For example, the continued development of 
the jurisprudence along disparate “lines” may be facilitated through 
aggressive adoption of this strategy by plaintiffs (for example, separate 
lines favoring and opposing a jus cogens exception for grave human rights 
violations). As a result, the inconsistencies in the jurisprudence will 
become more marked and entrenched, leading to additional challenges 
related to deterrence, impunity and fairness. 
Yet one additional strategy may be emerging in the wake of Samantar 
for plaintiffs bringing suits against foreign officials for human rights 
abuses. In certain cases where plaintiffs have attempted to sue the foreign 
official directly (i.e., as opposed to his or her government or state), courts 
have determined that the “real party in interest” is the state itself and 
proceeded to apply FSIA and not the common law. This judicial reasoning, 
which is supported by Samantar itself, has resulted in outcomes granting 
conduct-based immunity to defendants under the FSIA for their official 
conduct.136 In order to possibly avoid the general, “default” grant of 
immunity under the FSIA, and proceed under the potentially more lenient 
common law, plaintiffs may want to more explicitly and specifically frame 
their allegations and case theory directly against defendants in their 
personal capacities.137 For example, in order to possibly increase their 
chances of “piercing” the immunity veil and to the extent possible under 
the case facts, plaintiffs could frame their allegations as involving conduct 
directly attributable to the defendant himself without explicit connection to 
the state.138 In this regard, plaintiffs could seek damages exclusively from 
the defendant and not the state.139 
In sum, in the context of plaintiffs seeking to sue foreign official 
defendants in U.S. courts, the following sequential approach may be 
preferred in light of the post-Samantar jurisprudential landscape: 
(1) Obtain a waiver of immunity from the official’s home government 
and/or apply pressure on the Executive Branch to issue an SOI 
expressly denying immunity to the official; 
 
 136.  See supra notes 92–101 and accompanying text; see also supra note 88 and accompanying 
text; Keitner, supra note 132, at 847 (“The defendant can claim that the state is the real party in interest 
. . . if the relief sought would run directly against the state. If the state is the real party in interest, the 
claim against the defendant should be dismissed based on common law immunity or failure to name the 
real party in interest; the plaintiff might be required to refile the complaint against the state itself under 
the FSIA . . . .”).  
 137.  See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 138.  See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text (referring to “personal capacity” versus 
“official capacity” suits). 
 139.  See supra notes 45, 101 and accompanying text. 
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(2) To the extent possible, engage in forum shopping by selecting a 
court that is most likely to “pierce” the immunity veil and address 
the merits of the claims in those cases where the executive 
guidance on immunity is unfavorable or a foreign government 
waiver is not obtained, or alternatively, choosing a court that is 
most likely to uphold a foreign government waiver or the 
executive’s determination in those cases where the executive 
guidance is favorable). 
(3) To increase the chance of avoiding the application of FSIA and its 
general grant of immunity and instead proceed under the 
potentially more favorable common law, explicitly frame 
allegations and case theory against defendants in their personal or 
private capacities (i.e., as opposed to against the state), and seek 
damages exclusively from the defendant himself. 
CONCLUSION 
The common law of foreign official, conduct-based immunity is in a 
state of flux. As a result, even the most deserving plaintiffs face barriers to 
suit. The uncertainty may mean that two foreign official defendants with 
similar case facts experience different outcomes depending on where a 
lawsuit is brought, leading to concerns related to deterrence and overall 
fairness. The uncertainty may also make it more difficult for individual 
litigants to predict likely immunity findings. This, in turn, may lead to 
fewer case settlements and an accompanying strain on the resources of both 
the plaintiff and the judiciary. The uncertainty or unpredictability may also 
have the opposite effect of delaying jurisprudential development, if 
putative plaintiffs (incorrectly) perceive their chances of winning a lawsuit 
to be weak, and therefore decline to bring suit. On the jus cogens issue in 
particular, it is at least possible that the split among the U.S. circuits 
reflects the state of uncertainty in customary international law and among 
foreign national precedents on this question. Though U.S. courts can 
contribute to the further development of customary law on this issue, its 
ultimate resolution, at least in the U.S., awaits a future decision by the 
Supreme Court (or perhaps legislation by the U.S. Congress). Regarding 
status-based, head of state immunity following Samantar, a clear consensus 
has developed that executive guidance is determinative. In addition, a 
limited number of exceptions to this immunity have been explored in the 
case law. Finally, the post-Samantar jurisprudence suggests several 
strategies for putative plaintiffs suing heads of state and foreign officials 
claiming immunity for human rights abuses and other wrongs, including 
seeking a waiver from the foreign state and applying pressure on the 
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executive branch. In the case of suits against foreign officials alleging 
conduct-based immunity, plaintiffs may wish, to the extent possible, to 
engage in strategic “forum-shopping” as well as frame their allegations and 
case theory in particular ways. These tactics nonetheless do not guarantee 
that American courts will ultimately pierce the immunity veil and address 
the merits of the underlying claim. 
 
